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In the beginning of the fifties, a European defense community proved to be beyond realization.
In 1989 Ian Gambles discussed the matter anew and concluded that the prospects for a European pillar or defense entity lay in external developments.
The turn of this decade showed breathtaking changes in the area of security and European integration.
Hence it was worthwhile to analyze the chances for a European defense entity.
The study first analyzes the recent changes and how they influence the matter. Then it describes recent, current and future activities within NATO, the European Communities, the West European Union and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Based on the results it describes a possible scenario and the part the armed forces can play. Whether the traditional Atlantic system of West European security cooperation will in fact be a more independent cooperative West European system is not certain and depends on the evolution of external variables 1 He continued that the likely scenario is the continuation of the current cooperation within NATO, either more loosely or under more West European management. Less likely, but still conceivable, were:
Re-nationalization of West European security policies with a fragmented network of cooperative arrangements, or an increasing concertation of security policies under the management of the European Community. The actual course of events will be determined by broader political movements. . . .3
These trends have been apparent in recent years. Hence it is worthwhile to study the current possibilities for change towards a European defense entity. Such an entity might occur within a framework of a greater organization dealing with more facets of international relations, such as the European Community (EC), or in an organization focused principally on security. This paper will analyze the possibilities for a European security entity.
The European security environnent will be outlined and notewort'., Lhinges addressed. The prospects of the various European organizations will be analyzed with respect to security. Where necessary, the United States and Canada will be treated as parts of the European security environment. Based on this analysis a possible scenario will be depicted. This paper reflects a European point of view with a Dutch perspective. 4 For the purpose of this paper: "East Europe" will mean the area of the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.); 5 "Central Europe" will refer generally to the area of the non-Soviet nations that once were members of the Warsaw Pact.
INFLUENCES AND OPTIONS
INFLUENCES Security Policy
Security policy is that part of government or alliance policy that endeavors to create favorable conditions between and within nations for the implementation of policy priorities in other interest areAs. 6 This, however, is a rather "modern" definition.
Historically, since 1815, the security policy in Europe has been defined in terms of a (military) balance between Russia, Germany, Great Britain,
France and Austria-Hungary. The balance was not stable as diplomacy continuously focused on efforts to gain relative importance or freedom of action. This diplomacy repeatedly failed.
The last failure resulted in World War II and depleted tne strength of the European nations to such an extenL that they became receptive to new forms of cooperation.
The first real attempts at multilateral cooperation were directed towards containing the Germans.
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Successes were made predominately in "soft" fields like industrialization, trade, commerce, agriculture, fishing-industry, etc.
Cooperation in foreign policy and defense matters (the "hard" areas where national sovereignty is c3ncerned) never exceeded the level of cooperation or action by unanimity.
The realization that security policy encompassed more than foreign policy and defense matters became especially evident in Europe when Japan became an economic world power without having a supporting military force. Economic strength now generally is considered to be a part of national or alliance power.
There is a trend to incorporate all "threats" in security policy. In this view "threats" are defined as all factors that destabilize society. Examples are abuses of the ecological environment, a lack of ethical values, public health problems (drugs), large gaps between the rich and the poor, intolerance of minorities and minority views, and the poor relations between some governments and their people, i.e., dictatorship. Armed forces are not meant to fight these kinds of threats, but they can contribute.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Soviet Union
The struggles of the U.S.S.R. with its restructuring process, its economic failure, and its problem with the ethnic minorities, have virtually halted the process of democratization.
8
The question now is more how far Gorbachev will have to withdraw from the current situation to avoid the collapse and disintegration of the U.S.S.R.
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The fact is that within the Conventional The reinforcement of their naval component especially is considered by the West and the Central European countries to be a violation of the CFE-Agreement and will considerably delay or even preclude its ratification. This certainly will play into the hands of the Soviet military as they consider the CFE already as too much of a concession to the West.
Although not the adversary it was during the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. is also not likely to be the friend it seemed to be in the past few years. Relations between the U.S.S.R. and the West will remain cool and will not intensify as long as the internal economic and political problems in the U.S.S.R. remain as they are.
Central Europe
The various countries of Central Europe are in different stages of progress.
In common with the U.S.S.R., they have economic and minorities problems. As they have departed from communism to greater or lesser degrees, their moves toward democracies and open-market economies are more advanced than those of the U.S.S.R. and carry more promises for the future, especially for Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. It might be because of the progress made so far that environmental problems and their consequences for the health of their respective populations are more poignantly felt in these nations.
Although they look forward to joining the West, more close cooperation will require more sophistication within their nations first. Central Europe is more and more appearing as developing at two speeds. The burden of the slower developers contributes to the problems of nations that so far have been more successful.
Economic refugees could threaten their still weak economies. The possible disintegration of Yugoslavia, for example, might aggravate this problem. Although long-term prospects are hopeful, for the short-term this region must expect harsh times.
German Reunification
For the next few years, Germany will need to focus its political and economic resources on the same environmental and economic infrastructure problems in the Eastern part of its country as the Central European countries.
Although its economy is respected, Germany must generate those financial resources while contributing generously both to the economic development of the U.S.S.R. and to the war effort of the coalition forces in the Gulf.
Everybody expects them to succeed in all these areas. It is no wonder that each of the other powers in the EC (France and the LK) fear for their own role as a political "heavyweight" within certain circles (like the EC, G-7 and the e7--uriy Ccunc!!).
Some fear that Germany will go its own way, will become more independent from the West or even turn toward the East for its interests. There is, however, nothing in Lhe political beta-ior -f Germrathat supports the notion of a more loose relationship with the West. On the contrary, Germany seems more determined than ever to remain linked with its Western allies. Hence, those fears arise more from a perception of a Germany that was, than of a Germany that is.
Other Developments a coordinated response from the EC (more precisely the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which endeavors to coordinate the forejon nolicv of the F members) have particularly detracted from the perception that the end Cf tte
Cold War was the beginning of a "new order" for the world and the noticn c7 unity between the EC members. The outcome of this conflict will, to a very high degree, influence the frequency of "adventurism" in the future and the role that the United Nations (UN) will be able to play. For the EC nations it might be an experience that fur the future they might be willing to prevent at all cost.
Threats
Based on these developments, three threats can be identified in Europe.
First, (parts of) the current U.S.S.R. have yet unknown governments with (nuclear) weapons, while it is unknown whether the current conflict prevention institutions will work; second, there has been a resurgence of nationalism and/or irredentism of ethnic minorities and reactions of majorities and,'cr third parties, which destabilize areas such that they cannot be contained; and Representatives and liaisons of former adversaries are now regular visitors.
There will also be the coordination of the follow-up effort for the CSCE (e.g., through new confidence building measures) and the CFE (through, for example, verification, the build-down and internal exchange of treaty limited equipment and the destruction of superfluous equipment). Moreover, there will be the preparations for the planned future arms control arrangements. NATO will continue to provide security for its members. NATO measures with regard to the Gulf crisis are an illustration: NA7O forces were sent to Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean, within NATO territory, as a precautionary measure to deter hostilities from spreading to Turkey.
NATO will also provide its concept for a new allied strategy this summer that will do away with forward defense, but will continue to employ conventional and nuclear forces. The discussions around the implementation, in particular, will indicate whether allied commitment will exceed lip service.
There is likely to be an increasing role for dual forces. Also, the incorporation of out-of-area operations will be unacceptab.-.
European nations do not want to get involved automatically in what they cc .ld regard as someone else's problem. They feel much more comfortable with the current solution in which they judge participation on a case-by-case basis.
The proposal of Secretary General Manfred Woerner for the passive acceptance of the use of NATO facilities on behalf of the out-of-area operations of one or more members will also be declined.
The United States has "apparently realized that Europeans would do far more if they could act independently as part of building Europe, rather than if they were seen as American satellites."'23 NATO has been an alliance of necessity, now it may be an alliance of convenience. What will serve the purpose of the nations will be retained and everytning that looks like an extension of national commitment will be reduced.
The common denominator will fall to a lower level. Problems have to be solved like the formation of multinational corps, stationing of foreign forces without "singularizing"
Germany, the allocation of major command positions over the participating nations, the role of France inside or outside the military structure of NATO, 2 5 and the role of nuclear forces in general.
The special position
France currently holds within NATO gives her more prestige and status, and provides her with more options than does "normal" membership. Why should she
give this up? What would she gain?
It must be feared that these negotiations will clearly show a decreasing degree of agreement, as France wants to restrict NATO to the role of military counterweight to the U.S.S.R.
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Gradually then, forces and commitments of member nations will be reduced, possibly towards other multinational organizations (WEU). NATO then will resemble a safety net, provided through a trans-Atlantic nuclear guarantee.
The speed with which this will happen depends on outside developments, especially the developments within the U.S.S.R. Hence, Secretary General
Woerner's view of NATO as the "Motor der Veraenderung in Europa" (engine of change in Europe) is difficult to understand. Whether defense matters will be included depends considerably on what currently is on the agenda. One hot item is the choice between "deepening" and "widening," i.e., the intensification of the ties between the members, or the acceptance of more members. The last admission of new members enlarged the diversity between the EC nations, thereby making it harder to reach agreement. The ensuing collective development of these relatively weaker economies drained the resources of the communities. Therefore, the communities decided to prioritize "deepening" the links between the current members. Next on the agenda of the EC is the development of the EMU. The EMU should be achieved in three phases:
The first phase has already started on 1 July 1990. In the second phase, to start in January 1994, national financial policies should be aligned and the European Central Bank (ECB)
should be founded. The third step would entail fixed exchange rates for the European currencies and the creation of a common currency, at a time to be determined. But there is a considerable disagreement on the approach, as the formation of the ECB prior to alignment of national budget policies creates room for a basic dispute on the role and independence of the national banks.
In Europe this means long enduring conflicts.
Also on the agenda is the formation of the European Political Union (EPU).
The EC did cover affairs on foreign economic policy. Lines are not always easy to draw, so cooperation on foreign affairs became more intense and the EPC was institutionalized.
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As unanimity was required it had a slow start.
However, agreements now take less time and achieve a higher level of agreement. So many problems and differences between the member nations on security issues already do exist that drastic acceleration of a very slow process cannot be expected in the near future.
Examples of the problems facing an EC defense entity are France's position on military participation in NATO, the disagreement over federacy or confederacy and the role of nuclear weapons. Hence, a political union with a European defense entity is no option yet, despite all rhetoric.
A last point to be discussed is the relations between the EC and the United States. The United States wants them intensified. Europe fears the United States' influence if it were represented while topics of foreign policy are discussed. This concern, as so often occurs, resulted in a declaration.
The "Trans-Atlantic Declaration" provides for more periodic meetings between the highest representatives of both sides. Hence, the choice will be postponed. The WEU itself wants it that way.
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The WEU as a part of the EC is then a possibility for the post-1998 period.
A EUROPEAN DEFENSE ENTITY WITHIN THE CSCE
The Helsinki Conference of 1975 on CSCE resulted in three major baskets.
The first basket dealt with interstate behavior, human rights and the use of force. It refers to the "broader" definition of security, adding the relations of the government towards its subjects and the interaction between internal and external factors of national security to the generally accepted notion of security as the result of the quality of military relations between nations. It also confirmed the national boundaries.
The second basket referred to economic, technological and environmental cooperation. This recommendation has not been highly implemented, as the Eastern and Central European economies were unable to put the Western credits into productive uses.
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The third basket elaborated on the subject of human rights.
Initially it was used to defend the rights of individuals (Sacharov). In a later phase it was applied more extensively to the rule of law and the collective freedom of rights (religion, opinion, press, political parties, etc.).
The signing of the CSCE Charter of Paris, together with the CFE-I Agreement last November entails an incredible step forward for the security of Although the results are impressive, some comments need to be made. The CSCE process served to confirm a bipolar world. But the world is no longer bipolar. The U.S.S.R., once a superpower able to decidedly influence measures, is preoccupied with its internal problems and less a predictable factor. Central Europe does not follow the U.S.S.R. line any more. Their current orientation is more to the West or nationalist than to the East.
Moreover, conflicts now may result from ethnic minorities within one or more countries and a nationalistic counteraction (pogroms), rather than from a confrontation between the U.S.S.R. and the West. The CSCE, however, addresses the resolution of violent conflicts between nations rather than those within the nations.
Although those problems can be discussed as well, every nation will be able to block actions as the CSCE is not legally binding, consensus is required and no regulation exists to enforce measures.
Economic development, the second basket, is now undertaken by the EC. The CSCE is not a factor of influence in this sphere. Hence, although the CSCE is said to be the beginning of a new order, it could also easily be described as the end of an old world, as it was set up for a bipolar world. In itself this is not the greatest problem as the Treaty includes arrangements for the situation that ratification has not yet taken place. The use of perceived "loopholes," however, is not confidence building and will be counterproductive. Moreover, the struggle for independence of some Soviet Republics, and for unity by President Gorbachev, are likely to introduce measures that are not in line with the human and democratic rights as expressed in the CSCE Charter. Hence, the CSCE document is still very weak. Plans are being made for further development. For the CSCE it will suffice to consolidate the results now achieved. For now, it is enough to conclude that the CSCE in the near future in no way will be able to provide for or be a substitute to a truly European defense entity.
EVALUATION AND FUTURE
NATO can be seen as a safety net. The ongoing adjustments to this organization refer to the retention of capabilities rather than to a drastic change towards a future security situation, and even less towards the formation of a European pillar.
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Within the EC, Europeanization is a realistic possibility, though not for the near future. The WEU could become the defense entity within the EC, but it is likely to remain on its own for at least the next five years. So far, it does not have any forces on an institutionalized basis.
As it is unclear when the decreasing importance of NATO will start to show, and with current NATO efforts still oriented on providing forces for a new strategy, the WEU is not expected to be assigned forces other than on a case-by-case basis within the next five years.
Collective security, enforced through military means, within the CSCE will also be a solution for the long-term. It requires the consolidation of CSCE, including CFE, and further institutionalization towards a regional security organization. This will take at least ten years. Hence, Europe will remain a pluralistic security community until well after the change of the millennium.
The question might be raised whether we must be satisfied with this situation or not. Certainly, those who favor the simplicity of a United
States of Europe with one integrated army might be disappointed. On the other hand, a pluralistic security environment is capable of reflecting and absorbing differences in the points of views of participating nations without stigmatizing them for different stances. Indeed, integration this way will be a very slow process, but the cooperation of all involved is required, if success is ever to be expected. The lack of success of the League of Nations and the United Nations have made that abundantly clear. Hence, the task of integration will be completed successfully only by the next generation or their children.
Another aspect complicates the issue. Security has been enforced traditionally by politics, diplomacy, and the use or threat of use of militarv
force. An emerging general opinion is that the military factor now has reduced influence, as the idea of the threat changes and less (financial) resources are made available. The economic factor is assumed to have an increased role. However, the ability of nations to control their economies is progressively being challenged by the growth of international corporations, with substantial interests in their competitors overseas. The ability of nations to enforce economic measures will be limited as they will find it hard to identify who and what can be held accountable. The growth in exchange of information, and the ensuing ability to quickly react to changes in situations will be largely beyond the control of individual nations.
The development of the concept of security has already been discussed, and that process is still not finalized. New areas of threat may be introduced. This would require a new specification with regard to the military commitment resulting from Article V of the re'ised Brussels Treaty.
Thus assimilated, the EC might then be able to adopt these nations as members in the next century.
In the meantime, the EC has to develop itself along the lines depicted earlier.
Of most importance will be to develop the democratic structure of the EC. This will be a tougher nut to crack than the completion of the inner market, the forming of the EMU and the beginning of the EPU.
With regard to the armed forces, a transition could occur along the following lines: initially, the various national forces would be reorganized.
This would incorporate the implementation of reduction plans and the formation of more mobile and flexible forces. The majority of these forces will be made available to NATO and employed as guard forces, main forces in mechanized formations, and mobilizable reinforcements. Some nations will also contribute to the rapid deployment force. Part of these forces will be dual role, i.e., made available to NATO and, if need be, temporarily to the UN, the WEU, the CSCE or other collective security arrangements.
In a following period, after the dust on the current changes has settled and further arrangements seem to be justified by the developments in the international situation, more and more forces might be transferred from NATO to other roles. These roles might be national: the allocation of new missions that will result from a further development and analysis of security issues. But these forces might also be redirected towards the UN, and on a more permanent basis, towards the European defense entities.
Then, in a further development, more and more forces will be part of a European integrated force structure. The center of gravity for West European Defense will shift towards the EC. In this situation, NATO's role will be limited to a political alliance, to which American and European forces will be assigned as necessary. These conditions will remain as long as the American nuclear guarantee remains indispensable for European survival.
Collective security will then be maintained in a more loose relationship between the United States and a united Europe. Certainly, conflicts between the two parties will occur as they do nowadays. But they still do share more common interests with each other than with any other entity. Hence, it will be likely that eventual global crises then will be solved as they are solved now: with the peoples and the forces of the United States and Europe together on the same side.
Ultimately, we are most likely to see the WEU incorporated in an EC that is a healthy and vibrant alliance supported by its population in which all aspects of politics and life are covered. Once the peoples of Europe grow accustomed to this situation, they will feel themselves more European than members of a nation state. At this point, a true United States of Europe will have become a reality.
CONCLUSIONS
This monograph has explored whether, due to the changes that have occurred in recent years, the chances for forming a European pillar, within NATO or otherwise, have improved.
With regard to the changes, the concept of security has evolved and grown in complexity.
In the area of international developments, the end of the Cold War has included a more internationally cooperative U.S.S.R., but also a U.S.S.R. that is somewhat regressing as it is unable to do away with communism. As a consequence, the economy is worse than ever, democratization has come to a halt, republics try to break away and conservative powers seem to strengthen. The best we can expect from the U.S.S.R. is nonopposition to
Western initiatives, as it is preoccupied with its internal problems. In
Central Europe, nations have been able to make the change towards democratization and open market economies in varying degrees.
They cannot be dealt with as one entity. In the meantime, there is a power vacuum in which ethnic problems may become violent. Western politics in this area must balance between support of the Central European nations without rebuffing the U.S.S.R., and making available financial resources while coping with economic problems at home. In the meantime the West has tried to adjust to the developing situation through new integration efforts in West Europe. In this changed environment, the threats have changed as well.
NATO was quick to adjust. It is doubtful, however, whether it will be able to do more than represent the Trans-Atlantic link and provide for the ultimate nuclear guarantee, in view of the range and scale of differences on nearly every issue. NATO is not the institution to provide for a European defense pillar.
The EC faces a formidable program towards further integration.
Furthermore, its internal democratic institutions are still very weak.
Moreover, there is a continuing disagreement between decision making through unanimity or majority rule. Notwithstanding the difficulty, there is a real fervor to overcome all these problems on even the highest political levels.
The main reasons are that the peoples of the nations aspire, even ahead of their politicians, that a united Europe will be much better equipped to keep up the competition with the other major powers, and that it will bring clear and substantial economic benefits.
Ultimately, when progress continues, security policy will be part of the European Political Union and probably through the West European Union, as was proposed by Kohl and Miterrand.
However, it will take much time to overcome the inherent problems. In the meantime, assuming the Treaty of Brussels is valid until 1998, the WEU will be able to provide for ad hoc solutions to international conflicts.
The CSCE will, pending the resolution of the problems in the U.S.S.R., have enough on its agenda to consolidate the agreements and commitments agreed so far. It will, through its sheer size, young history and consensus arrangements, not be able to replace any other organization in the foreseeable future.
Hence, the European security environment will remain a pluralistic one, able to adjust itself to the nuanced requirements of the situation. There is no doubt, however, that the EC will mature to be the major organization in the area, and in the far future will include a real European Defense Entity.
Major problems will have to be overcome. But as the econouic conditions require adjustment of national economies to the integration process of the EC, be they members or not, ultimately nations will not want to be left out and isolated. Eventually, reluctance will be overcome as the younger generations will grow to be more and more Europe conscious and will push their governments. It will be clear then that we will have distinctly passed into the next millennium. For now, we must clear the path. 
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